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Summary
The Secret of Ministerial Responsibility. The Relationship between Crown, 
Cabinet, Chamber and Constituencies.
Today, we tend to conceive of ministerial responsibility as a rule. Unquestio-
ningly it is assumed that ministers are responsible solely to parliament for 
all their acts. Originally however, ministerial responsibility was a relational 
concept, which referred to the relationship between crown, cabinet, (Se-
cond) Chamber and constituencies; the four ‘c’s’. Ministerial responsibility 
was so to speak an instrument to keep those four constitutional powers in 
balance. In the period 1848 to 1905 eventually one interpretation came to the 
fore. In spite of this still dominant interpretation ministerial responsibility 
is essentially a relational concept providing for a constitutional equilibrium.
During the constitutional revision of 1848 the principle of political ministe-
rial responsibility was incorporated into the written constitution for the first 
time, and ever since this provision has been largely unaffected. The revision 
took place under great political pressure, because everywhere in Europe 
revolutions had broken out or threatened to break out. In 1848 remarkably 
the Second Chamber (Lower House) and the press were suddenly radicali-
zed though not so much the king. Tradition has it that the king explained to 
some foreign envoys that from one day to the next he had turned into a libe-
ral, but in effect the Speaker of the Second Chamber had let him know that 
even the conservatives had withdrawn their support, because the submitted 
proposals for amendment were not far-reaching enough.
 In the build-up to the constitutional revision in 1848 the Second Cham-
Geheim ministeriele PROEFSCH.indd   469 26-10-11   13:03
470
het geheim van de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid
ber already tended to perceive ministerial responsibility as the trust it could 
put in a minister. The opinion in Dutch legal literature that ministerial res-
ponsibility and parliamentary confidence have to be separated from each 
other is not tenable in that respect. In Great Britain a comparable situation 
existed. There too, responsibility and confidence were two sides of the same 
coin. The current distinction between responsibility and the supply of in-
formation is not based on the history of the development of ministerial 
responsibility either; from the beginning the duty to provide information 
was associated with the parliamentary vote of confidence. Ministerial res-
ponsibility has always been a fiction, starting from the idea that a minister 
has to organise state affairs in such a way that his responsibility becomes 
acceptable. Subsequent developments such as the rise of the civil service as 
a power of its own were in fact already included in the broad definition that 
was inserted into the constitution of 1848.
The balancing effect of ministerial responsibility
In 1848 parliament immediately acknowledged the need for homogeneity 
(unanimity) among and the collective responsibility of ministers. The mu-
tual responsibility of all ministers, just like the need for unanimity of the 
ministers thus became a long-standing political tradition. This explains 
possibly why in the Netherlands the office of Prime Minister did not deve-
lop to such a dominant position that individual ministerial responsibility 
was harmed. Unknown in the present literature is the fact that in 1848-
1849 Dirk Donker Curtius also wielded power as prime minister (after 
Gerrit Schimmelpenninck). The premiership is more deeply rooted in the 
Dutch political tradition than has been supposed so far. Its origin lies in 
the practice of appointing a person charged with forming a new govern-
ment (‘formateur’), who was naturally considered to be the prime mover 
of the cabinet. That situation remained, though subsequently Johan Ru-
dolf Thorbecke – his first cabinet lasted from 1849 until 1853 – introduced 
a rotating chairmanship of the council of ministers. Moreover, King Wil-
liam the Second had already determined to keep the cabinet at a distance 
from the head of state during the constitutional revisions. A Second Cham-
ber chosen directly and a First Chamber chosen indirectly by the constitu-
encies were to counter the powers of king and ministers. The radical chan-
ges in the constitutional balance of powers in 1848 thus did not only relate 
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to parliament and king, but also to the ministers and the people, who were 
recognized as independent constitutional powers.
It is a striking fact that in 1848 the provision about ministerial responsibi-
lity was not under discussion at all; it was merely its consequences for the 
other constitutional powers and constitutional bodies that were discussed. 
Everybody agreed with the principle of ministerial responsibility, because 
it was conceived as a relational concept. By this relational character it was 
not so much the content that was emphasized as the relationship between 
the constitutional powers. What this relationship would look like precisely 
was left open, and therefore different interpretations about ministerial res-
ponsibility could still exist. The relationship between cabinet and constitu-
encies played a part in the April-movement in 1853, when Thorbecke’s ca-
binet was blamed for inadequately informing the people. The king adjusted 
the elevated status of cabinet and Chamber by showing himself quite res-
ponsive to the emotions of the orthodox part of the nation, however wit-
hout meeting its wishes. Finally, the general idea then seemed to be that 
the king as a distinct power still possessed autonomous competence, such 
as the appointment and dismissal of ministers. At the same time constitu-
ents and inhabitants became aware that they too were a constitutional po-
wer on their own right.
The relationship between liberals and conservatives became very tense, as 
both parties experimented with the (im)possibilities of the parliamentary 
system of 1848. So in the period 1866-1868 they fought for supremacy in 
politics by way of a verbal sword-play about the meaning of ministerial 
responsibility. The liberals, who held a majority in parliament, argued that 
ministerial responsibility applied completely and exclusively towards par-
liament. The conservatives, who formed the Van Zuylen cabinet (1866-
1868), contended, by contrast, that the ministerial responsibility did not 
apply fully and did not refer to official appointments, such as the appoint-
ment of Minister of Colonies Mijer as governor-general of the East Indies. 
According to them ministerial responsibility became an issue only when 
there was a breach of the law or an infringement of the national interest.
The liberals laid emphasis on the general article of the constitution about 
the ministerial responsibility – the king can do no wrong, the ministers are 
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responsible – while the conservatives argued that the countersignature of 
a minister only related to decisions and consequently had nothing to do 
with acts, whereas specific articles also prevailed about all kinds of royal 
privileges, such as the appointment and the dismissal of ministers, and 
dissolution of parliament. The conclusion reached in 1868 was that the 
right to dissolve the government lost out to the right of the Second Cham-
ber to approve the budget, as each time a liberal majority in the Second 
Chamber was returned which finally overturned the conservative cabinet 
without a substantive reason. The lesson was that ministerial responsibi-
lity did not imply guilt, but did involve a strict liability.
Dualism gives way to monism
As a result of the Van Zuylen and Luxemburg issues the model of a royal 
cabinet – that is a cabinet with autonomous powers – was abandoned in 
favour of the model of a parliamentary cabinet, in which the cabinet was 
accountable completely and solely to parliament. In 1848 Thorbecke and 
most liberals had been advocates of the former model, but in the heat of 
the political battle they now selected the other interpretation of ministerial 
responsibility. It meant first of all that the existing balance between the 
power of the Chamber and the power of the government – dualism – was 
broken. This shift of power changed also the perception of the right of dis-
solution. In 1866 Thorbecke had argued this right to freely used by the 
government, but, in 1868, he suddenly was of the opinion as were all libe-
rals, that this right ought to be used only in exceptional circumstances, for 
example when required by the national interest.
 Because of their parliamentary majority, their dominant position in the 
Dutch polity and their promotion of the constitutional revision of 1848 as 
a liberal product, the new liberal interpretation of ministerial responsibi-
lity became dominant and achieved the character of a constitutional rule. 
This also proved to be the case on the issue of the succession to the throne 
by Emma and Wilhelmina, which occurred relatively peacefully because 
ministerial responsibility and the corresponding royal immunity were re-
garded in such a way that the actual person of the monarch no longer 
seemed so important. The formalisation of the office of Prime Minister by 
Abraham Kuyper finally confirmed this interpretation because of his more 
powerful position as cabinet leader with regard to the monarch. The cabi-
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net became more remote from the royal family, whereas, at the same time, 
collective ministerial responsibility towards parliament remained unchal-
lenged. Cabinet and ministers now established their own contacts with 
parliament and constituents and consequently their individual and collec-
tive responsibility became more important.
In short, the fact that the ministerial responsibly originally was relational 
in character, explains how the introduction of this concept at the constitu-
tional revision of 1848 could take place rather silently. As it happens, this 
revision did not need an agreement on the meaning of the concept, and 
that is why only later after much struggle was it decided which interpreta-
tion would become dominant. This struggle involved the four ‘c’s’ (crown, 
cabinet, Chamber and constituency) and in the period 1866-1868 finally 
the liberal majority in the Chamber successfully established its suprema-
cy. In that contest all means were attempted to strengthen each side’s ar-
gument, such as appealing to foreign authorities and in 1867 establishing 
the use of the motion of order for political aims as an invented tradition. 
Appointments, such as that of Mijer as governor of the East Indies, also 
became political in nature. This indicates the maturing of the parliamen-
tary system. In the wake of this development the voters gained more influ-
ence too.
 This interpretation of ministerial responsibility as a balancing mecha-
nism between the four ‘c’s’ offers a better explanation than the one emp-
hasizing its character as a constitutional rule. Thus the monarchy has pre-
served some political influence. Furthermore, ministerial responsibility is 
still considered problematic, because the Chamber does not always call 
ministers to account, and ministers in their turn do not always seem to 
take their responsibility seriously. The strength of ministerial responsibi-
lity does not lie in its objectivity. As the events of 1866-1868 have shown, 
ministerial responsibility is not measurable or strictly logical, but is always 
a risk based affair. Ministerial responsibility – with the related ideas of ro-
yal immunity, the obligation to provide information, the countersigning of 
decrees, and the right of dissolving the Chambers – functions continuous-
ly as the starting point for the political discussion that demarcates the com-
petences between and within the four constitutional powers in the state.
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